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Abstract
Despite nearly a decade of targeted federal government efforts to provide potable water to First Nations
communities in Canada, drinking water advisories and piped-water infrastructure gaps still persist. An in-
depth understanding of technical practitioners’ perspectives and experiences with federal policies, programs,
and processes (PPP) may provide unique insight into the challenges behind the issues. To meet this objective,
we interviewed 16 First Nations technical staff within the geopolitical boundary of the province of Ontario.
Results emphasize the role played by federal government-centric principles that shape policy, and the
inflexible nature of the program execution format. This study provides a foundation for understanding the
policy translation process and indicates action areas to create supportive policy for First Nations drinking
water service provision.
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The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) reported, “25 percent of the water systems 
and 20 percent of the sanitation systems [in First Nations communities] are substandard. They either 
pose a danger to health and safety or they are in need of repairs to meet basic government standards” 
(p. 179). This concern over access to safe, consistent drinking water in First Nations communities in 
Canada has since been reiterated by government and non-government agencies, First Nations 
organizations, and the media (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [CBC], 2006; Chiefs of Ontario, 
2001; Office of the Auditor General of Canada [OAGC], 2005). In the 2000s, the Government of 
Canada responded to drinking water concerns by creating a sequence of funding strategies over and 
above the baseline operating budget for First Nations services: the First Nations Water Management 
Strategy in 2003, the First Nations Water and Wastewater Action Plan in 2008, and, to a certain extent, 
Canada’s Economic Action Plan in 2009 (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada [INAC], 2009a; INAC - 
Audit and Assurance Services Branch [INAC-AASB], 2009). 
 
Despite nearly a decade of targeted federal efforts, however, field results indicate that federal strategies 
have not met the expected improvements (OAGC, 2005, 2011). Health Canada (2009) reported that 
for the period of 2003 to 2007, an average of 123 drinking water advisories (DWAs) were in effect 
every year in First Nations communities1. This concern was compounded by an annual increase in 
DWAs issued over the same period2. Similarly, the National Assessment of First Nations Water and 
Wastewater Systems, commissioned by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada3 (2011), reported that 1,880 
homes still remained without in-house piped water in 2009 compared to 5,300 such homes in 2001 
(INAC, 2003). First Nations citizens and politicians have expressed frustration with the current 
drinking water situation (CBC, 2005; Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; Safe Drinking Water Foundation-
Advanced Aboriginal Water Treatment Team [SDWF-AAWTT], 2009), which culminated most 
recently in a proposal to approach the United Nations to investigate potential human rights violations 
for homes that lack in-house piped water (Rabson, 2011). 
 
Academic literature on First Nations drinking water issues remains a sparsely populated field. Most 
data tend to be found in the ‘grey’ literature produced by government agencies or First Nations 
organizations. Past areas of study include regulatory framework gaps (Swain, Louttit, & Hrudey, 2006); 
organizational capacity challenges (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; Institute on Governance [IOG], 2006; 
Smith, Guest, Svrcek, & Farahbakhsh, 2006); infrastructure gaps and challenges (OAGC, 2005; 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, 2002); and control, authority, and devolution demands 
(Chiefs of Ontario, 2001). Yet, other than 10 uncoded community infrastructure profiles presented in 
the Chiefs of Ontario (2001) and the Polaris Institute (2008) publications, there is little in-depth 
research and analysis on the behaviour and nuances of federal policies, programs, and processes (PPPs) 
that govern drinking water service provision, including the planning, design, construction, and 
operation of drinking water systems, in First Nations communities. 
 
                                                           
1 A snapshot from May 31, 2011 indicates that 1-in-6 First Nations communities (n = 111) were under DWA 
(Health Canada, 2011). Median DWA duration is 39 days (Health Canada, 2009). 
2 The report notes that analysis of the upward trend is complicated by a concurrent increase in water monitoring, 
testing, and reporting. 
3 The federal ministry responsible for First Nations affairs has had many names including: Department of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) and, most recently, 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC). 
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history. We approached this complexity through a grounded theory methodology with a focus on the 
‘client’ perspective4. This focus on the client is purposeful. The voices of First Nations organizations 
and peoples tend to be found at the margins of the academic mainstream (Indigenous Peoples’ Health 
Research Centre [IPHRC], 2004; McGregor, 2008), particularly so in the technical realm. Our attempt 
to define this voice not only provides insight into the technical and policy challenges affecting drinking 
water service provision, but it also provides a much needed opening for a relatively untapped source of 
knowledge – the staff that fulfill technical duties for First Nations communities and organizations. 
 
An in-depth understanding of the ‘Ontario experience’ through the eyes of drinking water system 
operators, circuit rider trainers, tribal council technical advisors, and other technical practitioners may 
provide a richer understanding of the complex PPPs at work in Ontario, as well as shed light on what 
may be occurring in other provinces and territories in Canada. 
 
 
Policies, Programs, and Processes: An Overview 
 
Policies 
 
The First Nations – Government of Canada political relationship is one of the oldest areas of 
Canadian government policy. The political relationship has evolved over time in response to three 
policy paradigm periods: the military protectionist paradigm period (first contact – 1812), the 
assimilationist paradigm period (1812 – 1990s), and the ‘new’ paradigm period (1990s – present) 
(Howlett, 1994). Howlett (1994) defined the new paradigm as one of mutual recognition, peaceful co-
existence, and First Nations self-government. These principles became clearly established in the 
Canadian policy landscape through the 1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
recommendations (Tanner, 2001). 
 
Throughout the 1990s, new paradigm policy initiatives of self-government, natural resource co-
management, and program service devolution took centre stage in the First Nations – Government of 
Canada political relationship. Outcomes, however, indicate that the new paradigm principles have “yet 
to be institutionalized in a meaningful sense” (Howlett, 1994, p. 641). In one case, Innu Nation 
members experienced concerns regarding their community’s capacity to administer the institutional 
burden of self-government (Tanner, 2001). In another case, Kluane First Nation members perceived 
that the Dall sheep co-management process provided only token decision-making authority (Nadasdy, 
2003). A final case stems from a policy review of natural resource management devolution to First 
Nations in the Yukon Territory, which found that the process was in fact one of deconcentration, not 
devolution5 (Natcher & Davis, 2007). This dichotomy between autonomy-building initiatives and 
assimilationist outcomes was anticipated by Weaver (1990). She argued that the 1990s would be a 
transition period in which both old and new paradigms would co-exist, producing a “continuing 
tension between them, as the old ways of thinking gradually give way to the new” (p. 10). 
 
                                                           
4 First Nations define their relationship with the Government of Canada as nation-to-nation. This structure is 
most evident in the case of land claims and self-government agreements (Malloy, 2001). In terms of drinking 
water service provision, however, First Nations tend to be recipients, and thus clients, of the federally authored, 
administered, and ‘owned’ PPP. 
5 Deconcentration represents a transfer of administrative responsibility to smaller, geographically dispersed 
government units of the same central government. In this case, it refers to an imposition of Western institutions 
and ideologies on First Nations governments. 
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memorandum to Cabinet that proposed providing First Nations communities with physical 
infrastructure equal to that of their non-First Nations neighbours (Swain et al., 2006). In 1984, First 
Nations policy in Canada gained broad legislative muscle through the Supreme Court’s decision to 
recognize the federal government’s fiduciary responsibility towards First Nations (Morse, 1989), with 
drinking water service provision ostensibly falling within this responsibility (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; 
SDWF-AAWTT, 2009). Service provision devolution began in the early 1990s with day-to-day 
management and operation responsibilities being transferred to individual First Nations (Chiefs of 
Ontario, 2001; Swain et al., 2006). Policy initiatives built momentum through the 1990s and 2000s by 
way of a series of federal funding strategies: the Drinking Water Safety Program for Native People in 
1990 (Moore, 1999), the Gathering Strength water and sewer initiative in 1998 (OAGC, 2005), the 
First Nations Water Management Strategy in 2003, the First Nations Water and Wastewater Action 
Plan in 2008, and elements of Canada’s Economic Action Plan in 2009 (INAC, 2009a; INAC-AASB, 
2009). 
 
As with other new paradigm initiatives, drinking water service provision devolution has had mixed 
outcomes. First Nations find themselves: (i) working within a patchwork of policies, programs, and 
funding conditions (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; Swain et al., 2006); (ii) burdened by the complexity of 
multiple stakeholders and jurisdictional players (Swain et al., 2006); (iii) overwhelmed by the 
governance and managerial responsibilities (IOG, 2006); (iv) challenged by technical duties (IOG, 
2006; Smith et al., 2006); (v) lacking a support system (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; IOG, 1999); (vi) 
lacking regulation (IOG, 2006; Swain et al., 2006); and (vii) ultimately lacking the financial resources to 
respond (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; IOG, 1999; Swain et al., 2006). 
 
The marginal success of drinking water service devolution (OAGC, 2005) is evident in a report 
authored by the Safe Drinking Water Foundation - Advanced Aboriginal Water Treatment Team 
(2009) advocacy group. The report recommends that “[r]esponsibility and liability for providing safe 
drinking water should be passed back to INAC until such time as communities have water treatment 
plants that can, at a minimum, consistently meet all 56 health parameters of the Guidelines for Canadian 
Drinking Water Quality” (p. 3).  
 
Programs 
 
The jurisdictional and operational framework that governs First Nations drinking water programs is 
distinct from its non-First Nation counterparts (Swain et al., 2006). The framework is rooted in the 
Indian Act and is manifested as shown in Table 1. The table shows key jurisdictional players and 
stakeholders, as well as their associated roles in drinking water program implementation. INAC and 
First Nations band councils are the dominant players within this framework; these entities are 
responsible for the funding and execution of drinking water service provision. 
 
Service provision is dominated by three phases and their associated funding programs (in parentheses): 
system construction (Major Capital), minor system repairs and upgrades (Minor Capital), and system 
operation and maintenance (O&M). INAC serves as the funding agent with funding being provided 
through annual base funding in the form of INAC’s Capital Facilities and Maintenance Program, as 
well as ‘one-time’ targeted funding strategies (e.g. First Nations Water Management Strategy) (INAC-
AASB, 2009). All funding amounts are based on funding formulas and level of service standards 
defined by INAC (Department of Indian Affairs and North Development: Corporate Services - 
Departmental Audit and Evaluation Branch [DIAND: CSDAEB], 1997; INAC-AASB, 2009). The 
Capital Facilities and Maintenance Program is not exclusive to the needs of drinking water service  
3
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Actors and Roles in First Nations Drinking Water Service Provision 
 
Form 
 
Organization  Role 
 
 
Jurisdictional 
authority 
 
Band council & band administration  Project deliverya 
 
INAC  Fundinga 
 
Process quality controla 
 
Health Canada  Water monitoring quality controla 
 
 
 
 
 
Service institution 
 
 
Tribal councils &  
Ontario First Nations Technical Services 
Corporation 
Project management supportb 
 
Technical advice to affiliated First 
Nationsb 
 
Circuit Rider Training Program  On-site traininge 
 
Contractor 
Safe Water Operations Program service 
providers 
Long-term operations oversightc; d 
 
On-site trainingd 
 
a INAC, 2004; b INAC, 2009b; c INAC, 2008a; d Northern Waterworks Incorporated, 2010; e Ontario 
First Nations Technical Services Corporation, 2010. 
 
provision. Rather, it provides funding for a range of public works, including wastewater systems, roads 
and bridges, community buildings, schools and power service (INAC-AASB, 2009). 
 
Processes  
 
Major Capital funding is disbursed to a First Nation through the Major Capital Works process. This 
process is shaped by the Treasury Board’s policy for federally funded projects, specifically the Project 
Approval Policy (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2011). The Major Capital Works process consists 
of the standard sequence of engineering design and construction stages with an overlay of technical 
and financial review processes. The significant milestones in the review process are the Preliminary 
Project Approval submission (PPA) and the Effective Project Approval submission (EPA). These are 
‘go/no-go’ INAC reviews that release funding for the subsequent design and construction stages. 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the Major Capital Works process adapted from DIAND: 
CSDAEB (1997) and Taylor and Hill (2010). 
 
Figure 1 distinguishes the two parallel process streams according to action agent. The First Nation’s 
project team includes band council representatives, a project manager (often part of band 
administration), tribal council technical advisors, consultants, contractors, an INAC Capital 
Management Officer, and an INAC Technical Advisor. The federal ministries involved include INAC, 
Health Canada, Environment Canada, and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (Taylor 
& Hill, 2010). INAC is the lead action agent representing the Government of Canada. 
4
The International Indigenous Policy Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss1/3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Major Capital Works process. 
Minor Capital and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding is disbursed to a First Nation through 
funding arrangements and provided in ‘block’ funding format. These funds are typically transferred to 
First Nations on an annual basis and, therefore, are not represented in Figure 1. Block funding 
provides local discretion over fund usage, provided that funding agreement requirements are met. In 
terms of O&M, INAC provides 80% of a formula-calculated O&M budget (INAC, 1998). 
 
 
The Case Study: The ‘Ontario Experience’ 
 
Ontario is home to the largest First Nations population within a single province or territory in Canada. 
Twenty-three percent of the First Nations population lives in Ontario, with approximately 80,500 
people living in a First Nations community6 (DIAND, 2005). This population is distributed among 127 
First Nations communities, 34 of which are remote (INAC, 2008b). Relative to non-First Nations 
                                                           
6 An additional 81,200 First Nations citizens live outside of a First Nations community but within the province 
of Ontario (DIAND, 2005). 
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CONSTRUCTION WORKS  
FINANCIAL CONTROL PROCESS 
 
IMPLEMENTATION STAGES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INAC FUND ACQUISITION PROCESS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INAC TECHNICAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS 
 
5-Year Capital Plan prioritization 
 
Submission & 
Approval/Rejection 
Submission &  
Fund Release/Denial 
Milestone 
Reviews 
PPA  EPA 
Submission &  
Approval/Rejection 
Feasibility 
study 
Preliminary 
design 
Detailed 
design 
 
Construction 
Commissioning 
and warranty 
period 
Tender 
document 
preparation 
and tender 
bidding 
Fund negotiation 
and elasticity to 
accommodate 
tender costs 
FRONT-END STAGES 
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accessible (INAC, 2011a). 
 
Communities in Ontario are typically categorized according to geographic location (northern or 
southern) and road accessibility (accessible or remote). Generally speaking, northern Ontario has a 
colder climate, a bedrock geology defined by the Canadian Shield, and a low population density. In 
contrast, southern Ontario has a milder and shorter winter, sedimentary rock geology, and a high 
population density (Baldwin, Desloges, & Band, 2000; Natural Resources Canada, 2007). All remote 
communities are located in northern Ontario (INAC, 2008b). 
 
 
Methods 
 
From September to November of 2009, we conducted 13 face-to-face interviews with 16 First Nations 
technical practitioners from the province of Ontario. Three interviews consisted of two practitioners 
from the same organization being interviewed at the same time. The face-to-face interview process 
involved 6,000 kilometres of travel throughout Ontario. Recruitment included the snowball process 
and purposeful sampling7 at a First Nations technical tradeshow. 
 
For our study, we defined a ‘First Nations technical practitioner’ as a staff member of a First Nations 
organization that has the professional responsibility for: 
•  Operating or managing drinking water systems (operators or public works managers); 
•  Training or assisting drinking water system operators (trainers or operator association staff); 
•  Administering or advising the implementation of drinking water system projects (tribal council 
technical department staff or consulting engineers of First Nation-owned engineering firms); or 
•  Analysing drinking water system policies (policy analysts). 
 
By nature of their professional occupation, technical practitioners have varying experiences with PPP. 
Project team members have direct experience in PPP execution, while operators and trainers have 
direct experience with PPP outcomes. Policy analysts, on the other hand, have exposure to the 
statistics, reports, and government publications on PPP impetus and outcomes. 
 
Practitioner voice was diverse with professional experiences representing accessible and remote 
communities, small and large community populations, weak and strong economic conditions, and rural 
and suburban community development formats. Practitioner positions ranged from field-level to 
policy-level staff. Five practitioners were women and 11 practitioners voluntarily self-identified as 
being First Nations. 
 
Data collection and analysis followed grounded theory methodology from Creswell (2007) and was 
supplemented where necessary by Marvasti (2004). Briefly, this consisted of: (i) a semi-structured, 
pretested interview protocol document; (ii) a holistic and exploratory approach to data collection and 
analysis; (iii) verbatim transcriptions of audio-recorded interviews; (iv) transcription open coding using 
QSR International’s NVivo 8 software; (v) preliminary coding validation through a participant 
                                                           
7 Purposeful sampling was carried out through brochure distribution from a tradeshow booth and subsequent 
voluntary recruitment. Tradeshow delegates were almost exclusively First Nation technical practitioners from 
within Ontario, with the majority stemming from the First Nations operator community and First Nations 
technical advisory community.  
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analysis validation was completed through a triangulation exercise consisting of a document review of 
eight uncoded First Nations infrastructure case studies and media interviews. 
The University of Guelph Research Ethics Board approved the study. Verbal informed consent was 
provided by each study participant. All efforts were made to ensure confidentiality, as well as 
accommodate Indigenous-authored research ethics and best practices (see for example Erasmus and 
Ensign (1991); IPHRC (2004); National Aboriginal Health Organization [NAHO], (2007); & Smith 
(1999). 
 
 
Results 
 
Data analysis identified a dual central phenomenon that defines drinking water service provision PPP. 
This dual central phenomenon consists of a PPP paradigm and a PPP execution format. 
 
 
PPP Paradigm 
 
The first component of the central phenomenon reflects the governing principles, collectively called 
the PPP paradigm, that drive and control the PPP. First Nations technical practitioners’ experiences 
with the PPP ‘in action’ demonstrate a persistence of three principles: financial accountability, macro- 
and micro-control, and frugality. The following sections discuss each principle and provide a 
supporting table of interview-based, coded data. 
 
Financial accountability principle. Financial accountability structures how INAC can respond to 
and interacts with First Nations clients, and provides limits to INAC’s use of judgement and 
subjectivity. The overwhelming need for INAC to be accountable to external agents restricts its ability 
to respond to technical challenges. One participant noted: 
 
(…) think outside the box INAC! That’s one of the things I like to tell them at meetings is 
‘think outside the box’. They don't know how to. They can't. And their only way to defend 
themselves (…) is to go back to their procedures and guidelines, right? And ensure that they 
are being followed. (…) And that in itself in essence is the problem, right? Because stepping 
outside that box and trying to do something creative or better or more functional or whatever 
(…) is...is virtually impossible. (P7) 
 
A greater understanding of ‘the box’ that INAC must work within is provided in Table 2. The coding 
breakdown shows how the financial accountability principle inhibits INAC’s adaptability to the local 
context through an adherence to a standardized set of rules, guidelines, formulas, and criteria. At the 
same time, the financial accountability principle burdens the INAC – First Nations relationship with 
multiple levels of bureaucracy and external oversight. Figure 2 illustrates the direction of funding flow 
and accountability in First Nations drinking water service provision as presented in Table 2. The figure 
shows a stakeholder relationship where First Nations are at the start of the accountability chain and at 
the end of the funding flow chain. Accountability mechanisms within a First Nation itself were not 
richly discussed. 
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Financial Accountability Principle Breakdown 
 
To whom is INAC 
accountable? 
 
What is financial 
accountability? 
How is this achieved?  Which mechanism is 
used? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditor general 
 
Treasury board 
 
General public 
(Canada, not just 
Ontario) 
 
 
 
No subjectivity 
Reproducible process  Formula funding 
 
Consistent approach  
(i.e. one-size-fits-all) 
 
Rules and guidelines 
Maximum funding level 
defined (i.e. standards 
defined for infrastructure 
product) 
 
Funding criteria 
manuals  
(i.e. Level of Service 
Standards) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No fund abuse 
 
Fund only approved tasks 
Technical scrutiny 
 
Funding criteria 
manuals  
(i.e. Level of Service 
Standards) 
 
Quality control 
redundancy 
Multiple agency 
approvals 
 
Traceability  Reporting paper trail 
 
Minimize mismanagement 
opportunity 
Out-source to private 
sector 
 
Require Professional 
Project Manager (a 
pending policy) 
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Figure 2. Funding flow and accountability relationships. 
 
Macro- and micro-control principle. Macro- and micro-control is INAC’s modus operandi. It defines 
how INAC behaves in the course of its regular programming, and how it responds to unplanned 
situations. One participant discussed the day-to-day impact of this external control: 
 
I would like to see the First Nation be able to say what their priorities are. To be able to put 
the resources to where they believe the priorities are. Just like any other municipality does in 
the province; they have that ability. First Nations don’t have that ability. The government, for 
example, with this First Nations Infrastructure Funding [INAC special funding program] – 
they didn’t ask us [First Nations band] what the priorities should be. They didn’t ask First 
Nation peoples what their priorities would be. Somebody in an ivory tower set those priorities. 
And when I look at them? They’re the exact opposite of what ours are here. (P3) 
 
The various forms of macro- and micro-control, as discussed by practitioners, are presented in Table 3. 
The coding breakdown depicts INAC as a ministry with a dual role: client funder and project 
advancement gatekeeper. The breakdown further characterizes the INAC – First Nations relationship 
as a one-way relationship, where decision-making authority is maintained outside the First Nations’ 
realm of influence. 
 
 
Taxes / Canadian 
Public 
 
First Nations 
Band Council 
Federal 
Government / 
Treasury Board 
 
INAC 
 
Auditor General 
Legend:  
Flow of funds: 
Accountability direction: 
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Macro- and Micro-Control Principle Breakdown 
 
Whom does 
INAC control? 
What is control?  How is this 
achieved? 
Which mechanism is used? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Nations 
bands 
 
Tribal council 
(indirectly) 
 
Consultants 
(indirectly) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro-
level 
 
 
 
Fund use 
control 
 
Fund only 
approved 
components 
 
Funding criteria manuals  
(i.e. Level of Service Standards) 
 
Reporting 
 
Fund only 
approved amounts 
 
Formula funding 
Product 
control 
 
Technical review  Fund release conditional on approval 
 
Execution 
control 
 
Out-source to 
private sector 
Professional Project Manager 
 
Safe Water Operations Program 
service providers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macro-
level 
 
 
Fund use 
control  
Treasury Board 
Indian 
Programming 
budget provided 
directly to INAC 
 
Approved service categories and 
funding priorities  
 
Fund release protocols  
(i.e. public tender, local hiring clause) 
Product 
control 
Set design and 
operation standards 
Funds provided to meet, but not 
exceed, set standards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Process 
control 
 
Open-ended 
implementation 
timeline 
Funding application 
approval/rejection 
 
Project ranking placement on 5-Year 
Capital Plan 
 
 
Power 
centralization            
(i.e. information 
imbalance) 
No decision-process transparency 
(i.e. INAC operates as a ‘black-box’ 
towards band councils) 
 
Minimal reporting feedback to band 
councils 
 
 
Compliance with 
process rules 
Fund flow continuity  
(i.e. start or stop fund flow) 
 
Multi-stage approval process  
(i.e. PPA or EPA) 
10
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Frugality principle. Practitioner PPP experiences indicate how INAC consistently gravitates towards 
frugality in its decisions, actions, and institutional direction. Frugality is manifested through cost-
savings, not necessarily value-maximization (i.e. most ‘bang-for-your-buck’). As one participant noted, 
cost-saving may come at the expense of product quality: 
 
What does it mean to be cost effective? In my mind, yes, there is a term called 'cost effective', 
where one option is better or just as good as another option that is more expensive. In their 
[INAC] minds, whatever is the cheapest one. To me, that's not ‘cost effective’. (P9) 
 
Cost-savings, however, are not limited to product selection decisions. It also emerges in the form of 
delayed spending and low design standards. Table 4 presents the findings in greater detail. 
 
The coding breakdown alludes to a portfolio management approach to First Nations service programs. 
Portfolio management refers to the centralized management of one or more portfolios in order to 
achieve specific organizational objectives, and where success is measured in terms of aggregate 
performance (Project Management Institute, 2008). This approach results in a top-down evaluation of 
a project’s merit and an interconnectedness – and consequent vulnerability – of drinking water service 
provision to other service programs or portfolios (i.e. housing, health services). This approach, when 
pressed for funds, exhibits a ‘fund stretching’ phenomenon, which is characterized in the First Nations 
context by a penchant towards studies, piecemeal capital works approval, and bare essentials product 
design. 
 
PPP Execution Format 
 
The second half of the central phenomenon reflects PPP structure and client compatibility, 
characteristics collectively called the PPP execution format. Practitioners characterized the PPP format 
as ‘one-size-fits-all’ and emphasised the need for the execution format to appreciate and accommodate 
the diversity among First Nations communities, First Nations bands, and tribal councils. Here, we 
develop the premise of diversity by looking closer at three dominant themes, and by contextualizing 
the challenges this poses to the current PPP execution format by looking at a number of examples. 
The three themes investigated are capacity variations, infrastructure constructability variations, and 
societal diversity. Each theme is elaborated on using interview-based coded data figures or tables. 
 
Capacity variations. In terms of drinking water infrastructure implementation and operation, capacity 
refers to the abilities needed to operate and maintain a water treatment plant and distribution system, 
and complete a Major Capital Works process. For conciseness, capacity elements are grouped into four 
functional categories in accordance with practitioner comments: 
•  Formalized capacity (e.g., education levels, engineering titles, operator certification level); 
•  Demonstrated capacity (e.g., credit history, project execution track record, O&M budget 
control); 
•  Support systems (e.g., administrative, technical, financial management); and 
•  Financial strength (e.g., internal sources of revenue, community economy). 
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Frugality Principle Breakdown 
 
Towards whom does 
INAC behave 
frugally? 
 
What is frugality?  How is this 
achieved? 
Which mechanism is used? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First Nations bands 
 
Tribal councils 
 
Consultants (indirectly) 
 
Contractors (indirectly) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conform to annual budget, 
not annual need (i.e. 
infrastructure or 
operational) 
 
 
 
 
Target abstract costs, 
not true costs 
Formula funding 
 
Fixed rate for Indian 
Programming increase 
 
Lack of comprehensive 
operations and infrastructure 
needs assessment  
(i.e. dollar figure) 
 
 
Rigid to PPA cost 
estimates 
Reduce consultant budget 
 
Reduce construction scope 
pre or post tender submission 
 
 
Centralize funds; 
allocate Indian 
Programming funds to 
service categories, not 
individual bands 
One-pot funding structure 
(i.e. funding shifts impact 
other programs, other bands) 
 
One-off funding format 
(i.e. no continuity emphasis) 
 
 
 
 
Lower instantaneous 
spending 
 
Target lower standards 
Subpar design standards 
 
Subpar O&M standards 
 
 
Instantaneous cost 
evaluation, not life-
cycle cost evaluation 
Technical review design 
changes 
 
Reduced consultant budget 
 
 
 
 
 
Delay spending 
High report writing 
requirements 
 
Deflect to studies 
Risk management 
approach; act only as 
necessary 
Band-aid repairs 
 
Piecemeal community 
infrastructure development 
 
No enforcement or 
regulations 
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Interview findings show two general patterns: lower capacity in northern communities, particularly in 
remote communities, relative to southern communities (macro-level), and random variation of capacity 
between individual communities, band councils, band administrations, and tribal councils, regardless of 
location (micro-level). Further analysis of practitioner comments indicates: 
•  Demonstrated capacity is not restricted to southern communities. Northern communities, 
including remote communities, have shown demonstrated capacity; 
•  Support is least available in northern communities where formalized capacity is lowest; 
and 
•  Capacity loss (i.e. retention challenges) is most acute in northern communities, particularly 
in remote communities. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the two capacity patterns and data analysis findings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Patterns reflecting functional capacity categories as a function of community type. 
 
Formalized Capacity 
Support Systems 
Financial Strength 
Low 
Demonstrated 
Capacity 
High 
 
High 
 
Road Accessible 
 
 
NORTHERN 
COMMUNITIES 
Remote 
Road Accessible 
SOUTHERN 
COMMUNITIES 
Low 
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demonstrates heterogeneity among First Nations communities, First Nations bands and tribal councils. 
As one practitioner indicated, even with the same context (e.g., accessible or remote; northern or 
southern), heterogeneity challenges the creation of a single definition or ‘snapshot’ of First Nations’ 
capacities: 
 
(…) one of the classic things though that I see, say 20 km on the other side of the border of 
our tribal council, they [operators] are sitting there with no training at all. Nothing going on. 
They are looking over here at my guys getting together every one or two months [for training]. 
(P11) 
 
Infrastructure constructability variations. Infrastructure constructability variations highlight the 
logistical differences that affect construction projects in different parts of the province. In short, 
northern communities, particularly remote communities, have significantly more challenging 
construction logistics than their southern counterparts. Constructability variations noted by 
practitioners are described in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
 
Constructability Variations 
 
Construction Issue  Southern 
Communities 
Northern 
Communities 
Remote 
Communities 
Construction season 
 
All-year  (No data)  June – August 
Equipment mobilization / 
Demobilization access 
 
All-year  All-year  January – March 
(winter road) 
Ease of access /                     
Proximity to urban centre 
 
High  Medium  Low 
Skilled-labour pool access 
 
High  Medium  Low 
Logistical costs 
 
Average  (No data)  High 
Geotechnical conditions 
 
(No data)  Possible bedrock  Possible bedrock 
 
Simply put, constructability will directly affect the cost and timeline of community infrastructure 
projects, translating into a sluggish rate of infrastructure development. The construction limitations 
experienced in remote communities should not be underestimated, as indicated by the following 
remark: 
 
So the only way that they can bring in heavy material or heavy equipment is by winter road. 
And that winter road is typically open mid-January and closes typically mid-March. If you have 
a good season, you can start it earlier and extend it longer. If you have a bad season, that 
window gets smaller and smaller. Like, you may only have a four-week period where you haul 
in stuff. Sometimes the winter roads are opened up earlier but it's only to light traffic. So, they 
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hauled in. (P8) 
 
Societal diversity. Although First Nations are lumped together as one cultural group and 
consequently one federal ministry, there are significant variations in societal characteristics between 
First Nations themselves. Practitioners indicated that remote communities, relative to road-accessible 
communities, have a unique social structure in terms of leadership structure, perception and adoption 
of formal education, and occupational priorities. In many remote communities, traditional leadership8 
is very much involved with governance decisions, including the infrastructure development processes 
(e.g., project meetings, project direction decisions). This is noteworthy as both the engineering 
consultant and construction contractor professional charge-out structures and specialization-oriented 
organizational structures are not equipped to deal with direct involvement from traditional leadership. 
As one participant commented: 
 
And it's hard as well, for us from the technical [side]. Because we go in looking at more of the 
technical [aspects] and try to advise them on more of those aspects. Versus their cultural or 
other factors that may come into it, from TEK [traditional ecological knowledge] or others, 
that are unique and different than how we perceive things, from strictly trying to treat that 
water and making sure it's the safest (…) for consumption by the community. (P5) 
 
Societal diversity not only exists in organizational structure but also in social norms and practices. In 
some cases, the existing social structure in remote communities does not readily accommodate the 
‘nine to five’ work structure. The following dialogue highlights the convergence of two distinct sets of 
work structure norms and practices: 
 
P8: This fall for instance. Hunting season. One community – all the men are gone.  
P7: They are doing their traditional hunt.  
P8: For a week...You know? So who runs the water plants, the generating stations, the fuel 
farms and all that. There's nobody there. Everyone's gone. 
 
Although both quotations reflect remote communities, it does not imply that non-remote First 
Nations communities should be grouped together as one entity. On the contrary, leadership positions 
on economic development and O&M user-fee systems, for example, were found to vary throughout 
the province with no observable trend. In the case of user-fees, some band councils and communities 
have accepted user-fee incorporation into their water management structure, while others view user-
fees negatively as a form of taxation. 
 
Societal diversity within the First Nations cultural grouping was not pursued to great detail. The brief 
discussion above merely highlights how different First Nations societies express different needs, wants, 
and political visions through their band councils and political bodies. At a national or provincial level, 
these may at times appear contradictory or divided, and thus do not speak with one voice. Unto 
themselves, however, these may be entirely consistent. 
 
Policies, programs, and processes compatibility examples. INAC’s policies, programs, and 
processes are applied in an equal and standardized manner for all First Nations clients. The 
compatibility of this standardized approach, however, varies between First Nations communities, First 
Nations bands, and tribal councils. To better understand this, three PPP examples are briefly reviewed. 
                                                           
8 Many communities still operate with traditional systems of governance, which function alongside the public 
elections-based Indian Act system of Chief and Council. 
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Major Capital Works process. Practitioners noted that INAC’s Major Capital Works process caters to low 
capacity bands and inhibits growth in high capacity bands. The following comment reflects the 
frustration experienced by a high capacity band: 
 
Their [INAC] process needs to be streamlined so that it takes into account the First Nations 
abilities, the First Nations priorities. Because right now, the way it is …they [INAC] have too 
much control over the funding of projects. And I guess it comes from probably having to deal 
with First Nations that don’t have the capacity. Where they have to ‘hold hands’. So they think 
they got to hold everybody’s hands. And we’re saying [PHYSICAL GESTURE OF 
SEPARATION], you know? ‘Give me the freaking money, and we’ll get the job done.’ Never 
mind trying to tell us what to…every little thing what to do, and putting all these policies and 
procedures that are…really, hamper the implementation of the project. (P3) 
 
Even so, the overwhelming nature of the process inhibits low capacity bands, as evidenced in the 
following quotation: 
 
(…) if you're a First Nation that doesn't have any technical people, and you don't have a good 
tribal council to work with, things take a really long time. Because the First Nation doesn't 
know what steps to take, doesn't know what questions to ask. And then it just prolongs the 
process (...). (P8) 
 
O&M band contribution requirement. The O&M band contribution requirement (i.e. 20% of the budget) 
demonstrates a general incompatibility between mandate and reality. Band contribution requirement 
may be theoretically feasible in communities with viable economies; however, many First Nations 
communities face a dire economic reality that is incompatible with the principle of user-fees. This, in 
turn, sets the stage for two-tier service delivery as shown in the following comment on low operator 
salaries: 
 
So the rest of that money has to come from within the community itself. That's part of the 
reason why there's a huge parity [in operator salary]. Cause it makes it tough for a lot of 
communities with no...[or] with very little income generation. They have a difficult time 
topping up that wage. (P14) 
 
End-of-fiscal funding opportunity. The end-of-fiscal funding opportunity presents itself yearly between early 
January and March 31st, and has the unique benefit of being streamlined with a fast turnaround. The 
driver behind this funding opportunity is the termination of the fiscal year. This deadline prompts 
federal ministries to utilize the remaining budget in preparation for the upcoming budget request. As 
funds must be expended by March 31st, bands must have ‘shelf-ready’ designs9 to send out for tender 
and construction must be completed during winter months. As such, this opportunity favours bands 
with the internal funds to complete a design and those located in a geographic zone that permits 
construction during winter. As a result, in decreasing order, this opportunity favours: southern 
communities, road accessible northern communities, and, lastly, remote communities. One practitioner 
working with remote communities emphatically remarked on this issue: 
 
Interviewer: Is there anything you could see that would improve project implementation? That 
would make life easier for you? 
                                                           
9 Shelf-ready designs are those that have already gone through the feasibility study, preliminary design, detailed 
design, and contract document preparation stages. These designs are ready for tender and construction. 
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Remote communities’ incompatibility with the end-of-fiscal opportunity is dramatic. These 
communities: 
•  Have minimal, or no, internal funds (generalized trend); 
•  Face a construction shutdown in winter; 
•  Have a restricted contractor mobilization window governed by winter road conditions; and 
•  Require considerable leadtime for contractors to coordinate equipment mobilization on the 
winter roads. 
 
Unfortunately, many special funding programs follow the same end-of-fiscal funding schedule window. 
As such, remote communities, and to some degree all northern communities, miss out on community 
infrastructure development opportunities. One practitioner spoke to this limitation: 
 
(…) the fiscal timing and everything...just does not work for remote communities. All those 
initiatives that come out, the stimulus funding with CEAP [Canada’s Economic Action Plan], 
and FNIF [First Nation Infrastructure Funding], and all that stuff – it's all March 31st 
dependent. And it's basically stymieing us...we're becoming ineffective in being able to do 
anything because of the timing. (P7) 
 
The three PPP examples provide tangible descriptions of the PPP execution format. INAC’s emphasis 
on reproducibility and equality has resulted in a one-size-fits-all approach to program delivery, which 
produces PPP with incompatibilities to field conditions – a square peg, round hole phenomenon. The 
following quotation emphasizes the disconnect between INAC’s PPP objectives and the field results: 
 
You can work with these policies [First Nations content or employment clause in public 
tenders], if things work right. But for the most part, they are difficult to work with. And a lot 
of times First Nations will just throw up their hands and say ‘ok, that is so much work to do 
that, let's just tender it out’. (P10) 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The three governing principles – financial accountability, macro- and micro-control, and frugality – 
depict a PPP paradigm that is INAC-centric; one that places INAC’s, and by association the federal 
government’s, priorities first. This is in sharp contrast to INAC’s official mandate of “[w]orking 
together to make Canada a better place for Aboriginal and northern people and communities” (INAC, 
2011b, ¶ 1), and further still from a perceived mandate of making safe drinking water in First Nations 
communities a top priority. In terms of drinking water infrastructure, this disconnect is notable for two 
reasons. First, if INAC is not the ‘champion’ of First Nations infrastructure needs, then who is? And, 
how does this gap affect a community’s physical development? Second, although federal rhetoric and 
funding strategies over the past decade appear to be progressive and support autonomy-building 
initiatives, the PPP paradigm alludes to an institution that in practice is fundamentally unchanged. 
Unless INAC’s institutional memory and structure are dramatically changed to yield a First Nations-
centric institution, federal government efforts will continue to be diluted. 
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format that stifles high capacity First Nations organizations, overwhelms low capacity organizations, 
and in general fails to account for the heterogeneity within First Nations. As such, rather than provide 
an equally beneficial operating platform, the net result is an equally unaccommodating one-size-fits-all 
operating platform to no one group’s benefit. The take-home message is: In order to maximize PPP 
initiatives in Ontario, heterogeneity among First Nations must be treated as a dominant, not recessive, 
trait. Consequently, execution format flexibility to accommodate a diverse client base must be central 
to future drinking water infrastructure PPP. This is particularly critical in the context of drinking water 
service devolution where each First Nation band inevitably exhibits different rates of uptake and 
success with the devolved responsibilities. 
 
Should the above changes not be addressed, Canada runs the risk of perpetuating the funding cycle of 
dismay that has been witnessed over the last decade. The government performance audit on the First 
Nations Water Management Strategy alludes to this possibility. The audit found “most high-risk 
[drinking water] systems have improved to medium-risk rather than to low-risk” (INAC, 2007, p. 92). 
This statement indicates that the strategy has deflected, and not resolved, the First Nations drinking 
water crisis. As a starting point for change, future papers will present the practitioners’ visions for a 
future working environment, as well as a policy tool to accommodate client diversity. 
 
 
PPP Findings within the Existing Body of Knowledge 
 
PPP findings contribute to the existing body of knowledge on First Nations and Indigenous policy as 
follows: 
•  The PPP paradigm results provide another decade of data to Howlett’s (1994) study of First 
Nations policy change, indicating a continued failure to meaningfully implement the new 
paradigm in drinking water service provision; 
•  The evident competition between new and assimilationist paradigm principles supports 
Weaver’s (1990) prediction of a coexistence of old and new paradigms; 
•  The non-technical factors influencing drinking water program success, such as the lack of First 
Nations control and the underlying institutional paradigm, corroborate Nadasdy’s (2003) 
findings in the natural resource co-management field; 
•  The PPP paradigm provides a lens for analysing federal government responses to First 
Nations issues, such as the 2010 Bill S-11 for First Nations drinking water regulation (Senate 
of Canada, 2010); and 
•  The PPP experience in Canada provides a comparison for Indigenous policy reform taking 
place in other colonially structured countries. Australia, for example, has: (i) similarly 
abandoned its assimilationist policy paradigm in favour of a self-determination policy 
paradigm, (ii) not yet meaningfully implemented the new paradigm, (iii) not yet successfully 
devolved program services, and (iv) not yet accommodated the diversity in the Indigenous 
population (Sherwood & Edwards, 2006; Turner, 1997). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this article, we discussed the principles and format that govern drinking water infrastructure 
policies, programs, and processes in First Nations communities, and identified areas for change that 
otherwise may not be immediately obvious. Though findings are based on the Ontario context, the 
federal nature of First Nations policy may make these relevant to other provinces and territories in 
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